Hastings Law Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 1

Article 8

1-1955

Insurance: Liability of Insurer under Personal
Liability Policy for Damage Caused by Wilful
Misconduct of Insured's Child--Application of New
California Statute
Theodore H. Stokes Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Theodore H. Stokes Jr., Insurance: Liability of Insurer under Personal Liability Policy for Damage Caused by Wilful Misconduct of Insured's
Child--Application of New California Statute, 7 Hastings L.J. 98 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol7/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

has been to put the lion back in his cage. Until then, protection for the individual
appeared to be sacrificed at a disproportionate concern for the protection of society.
How long was protection for society to continue before it became an instrument which
would be used as an invitation and encouragement to law enforcing officers to violate
the Constitution, thus creating as great an evil as that which itsought to destroy?
Would modern scientific methods continue to be allowed for the purpose of crime
detection to the degree that innocent persons be kept fearful that their privacy was
subject to arbitrary invasion? It is not unreasonable to suppose that a liberal, nonexclusionary rule, especially in the light of the aforementioned decisions, could grow
to such disastrous extremes. It is submitted that the scales which weigh the two
conflicting needs have been correctly balanced-temporarily at least.
Henry Friedman.

INSURANCE: LIABILITY OF INSURER UNDER PERSONAL LIABILITY POLICY FOR
DAMAGE CAUSED BY WILFUL MISCONDUCT OF INSURED'S CHILD-APPLICATION OF NEW
Supreme Court of California has reached a decision in
the case of Arenson v. National Automobile and Casualty Insurance Co.' concerning
insurability of a parent against liability arising from tortious acts of a child. A California statute 2 imputing wilful misconduct of a child to his parents was passed
effective subsequent to the above decision. It is the purpose of this note to consider
the application of this statute to the instant case to determine the probable course of
similar future proceedings.
The action was by the insured for declaration of rights and determination of
the insurer's liability under a public liability policy. The case hinged on the wording
of the policy, wherein
CALIFORNIA STATUTE-The

"the unqualified word 'insured' includes (a) the named insured, (b) if residents of his
household, his spouse, the relatives of either, and any other person under the age of
twenty-one in the care of an insured ..... 3
The exclusion provision read:
"This policy does not apply: . . . (c) to injury, sickness, disease, death or destruc"
tion caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.
property. The school
damaged
school
a
fire
which
Plaintiff's minor son started
5
district obtained judgment against the plaintiff, his liability being fixed by statute
imposing liability on a parent for any damage to school property caused by a wilful
act of a pupil. The defendant refused to defend the action or pay the judgment on the
ground that the word "insured" was to be interpreted to include that class of
persons defined in the coverage clause of the policy. Hence, the intentional act of
the son as "insured," it was contended, fell within the exclusion clause of the policy
%45 A.C. 85, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
2 CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1714.1, a 1955 enactment.
' See note 1 supra at 86, 286 P.2d at 817.
'See note 1 supra at 87, 286 P.2d at 817.
CALIF. EDUCATION CODE § 16074 (1943). "Any pupil who wilfully cuts, defaces, or otherwise
injures in any way any property, real or personal, belonging to a school district is liable to suspension or expulsion, and the parent or guardian shall be liable for all damages so caused by the
pupil .. "

NOTES

Nov., 19551

and the California statute' which exempts insurers from liability for losses caused
by the wilful act of the insured. The plaintiff argued that the exclusion provision did
not preclude him from being indemnified against liability for intentional injury committed by another insured in which he did not participate.
In reversing the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and
finding the defendant liable for the amount of the judgment plus interest, costs and
attorneys' fees, the court looked beyond the mere words of the insurance contract
to the true purpose of it. The question of the meaning of the word "insured" made
operative the rule that any ambiguity in an insurance contract must be resolved against
the insurer. 7 This led to the consideration of a second rule that exceptions and exclu8
sions are construed strictly against the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured.
Having thus cracked the shell, the court was in position to get at the meat of the
problem, i.e., the true purpose behind the contract, considered in the light of ordinary
experience and public policy.
It was considered that had the additional coverage not been included in the policy,
undoubtedly the insured would have been indemnified against liability incurred
through the wilful act of his son. Why, then, should the clause designed to extend
coverage for the benefit of the insured be employed to deprive him of indemnification
he would have had, additional coverage notwithstanding? Clearly such was not the
intent of the clause. Authorities were cited in support of the proposition that a
policy extending coverage to several persons creates several obligations on the part
of the insurer, so that one insured is not precluded from recovering merely because
an exclusion provision bars another. 9 Hence, it was concluded that the statutory
provision to the effect that an insurer is not liable for loss caused by the wilful act
of the insured' 0 does not apply to a situation in which the insured is not personally
at fault."
This brings us to consideration of the statute imposing vicarious liability on
parents for intentional torts of their children, which became effective shortly after
judgment was rendered in the instant case. The Code reads:
Any act of wilful misconduct of a minor which results in any injury to the property

of another shall be imputed to the parents having custody or control of the minor for all
purposes of civil damage, and such parents . .. shall be jointly and severally liable with
such minor for any damages resulting from such misconduct.
Joint and several liability of one or both parents... under this section shall not
exceed three hundred dollars ($300) for each tort of the minor. The liability imposed
by this section is in addition to any liability now imposed by law.12

Now it must be determined whether or not the new statute would be applicable
to a case with a fact situation similar to that under consideration here; and if applied,
how it would affect the decision.
In order to place this bit of legislation in its proper perspective, it may be well
to briefly examine the development of the doctrine of vicarious liability of parents
for torts of their children. The common law did not recognize the doctrine at all,
* CALIF. INs. CODE § 533 (1935). "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act
of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents
or others."

7Ransom
v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal.2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954).
8
Mah See v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421, 213 Pac. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123 (1923) ; Pacific
Heating and Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburg, 158 Cal. 367, 111 Pac. 4 (1910).
Hoyt v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121, 148 A.L.R. 484 (1942).
0 CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (1955).
"Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 197 F.2d 673 (5th Cir., 1952).
"CALIF. CIV. CODE

§ 1714.1.
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though it developed that parents could be held liable where negligence could be
imputed through agency relation, or where their failure to act constituted negligence,
or where the parent had directed, encouraged or ratified the act. 13 Beyond this the
California courts would not venture; it remained for the Legislature to extend the
doctrine. This has been accomplished by enactments in the Vehicle Code 14 imputing
to the parents the negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor child in the operation
of a motor vehicle; and in the Education Code imputing liability to the parents for
any wilful damage caused by the pupil to property of the school district. 15
There is no doubt that the new statute is repugnant to the common law, and
therefore must be strictly construed and confined within its express limits.' 6 One
important point of distinction is noted between this statute and the Education Code
section applied in the case. That is, the latter merely imputes liability to the parents,
while the former imputes the act of wilful misconduct. It is also pointed out that
liability imposed under the new statute is in addition to any liability now imposed
by law. Therefore, it raises the question as to whether the statute could be used to
impute the act of wilful misconduct to the plaintiff in this case, and thus reduce or
destroy the liability of the defendant. Two other states' 7 have passed similar statutes,
but no reported cases have appeared construing them. Consequently, the matter must
be resolved by application of the rules of statutory construction, whereby requirements
of strict construction must be considered in the light of legislative intent.
Since the statutory liability is imposed in addition to any liability already provided by law, it could not be held to limit the liability of the parent to the school
district, and would not therefore alter that relationship. However, since the statute
is applicable to the fact situation, would the defendant in the instant case be able to
rely on this statutory imputation of wilful misconduct as a defense? A strong
argument could be made in the affirmative based on the wording of the statute alone.
Here there was damage to the property of another resulting from wilful misconduct
of the plaintiff's minor child of whom he had custody. Under the statute, this wilful
misconduct would be imputed to the plaintiff "for all purposes of civil damage."
Considering the words alone, it would seem that the insurer's liability here determined
by the California Supreme Court was the natural consequence of an act inflicting civil
damage. It may be well to note here that the word damage, as distinguished from
damages, denotes actual injury and does not include a right of action or compensation.' s Following this line of reasoning to a logical conclusion, the insured, having
qualified under the provisions of the statute, would be entitled to use it as a defense,
at least by way of reduction in the amount of the express limitation included in the
statute.
The decision in the instant case makes it clear that a literal interpretation must
be in accord with public policy, or give way to it. Following the pattern of reasoning
established by the court, we must determine the true intent of the Legislature enacting
the statute; and whether the result of the foregoing literal application of the statute
is in harmony with that intent.
Let us look first to the purpose of the statute. The most obvious aim is to
provide a satisfactory remedy for innocent third parties injured by a minor, where
3 PROSSER, TORTS § 102 (1955 ed.).
"4 CALIF. VEHICLE CODE

§ 352.

" See note 3 supra.

" Armas v. City of Oakland, 135 C.A. 411, 27 P.2d 666 (1933) ; Lucas v. City of Los Angeles,
10 Cal.2d 476, 75 P.2d 599 (1938).
" NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-801 (Supp. 1952) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1408(1) (Cur. Supp. 1953).
" 14 CAL. JUR. 2D 634.

